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What are we cheering?  
Sport and the value of valuing 
Tara Smith 
University of Texas (USA) 
Abstract  
Against the dismissal of sport as “only a game” not worth the deep investment that so many 
fans make in it, sport is often defended on the grounds that it cultivates important virtues of 
character that are useful in a range of real-life applications (discipline, resilience, pride, 
teamwork, and so on). Whatever merit these claims may have, this paper calls attention to 
something that has not been sufficiently previously appreciated, namely, what sport reveals 
about the nature of value. By considering the experience of the serious fan (rather than that of 
the player or casual spectator), the paper argues that sport illuminates important aspects of 
how to value, of the point of valuing, and of the propriety of valuing. It further argues that, 
even more fundamentally, the experience of the serious fan helps us to appreciate the ways in 
which valuing is itself a value. 
Keywords: sport, game, value, virtues 
Resumen 
Hay una visión del deporte según la cual éste es  “solamente juego” no digno de la profunda 
inversión que tantos  aficionados hacen en él. Frente a esta concepción el deporte se defiende 
a menudo apelando a que cultiva las virtudes del carácter (disciplina, resistencia, orgullo, 
trabajo en equipo, y así sucesivamente) que son útiles en diversos ámbitos de la vida real. 
Cualquiera que sea el mérito que estas pretensiones puedan tener, este trabajo llama la 
atención sobre algo que no se ha apreciado suficientemente hasta el momento, esto es, lo que 
deporte revela sobre la naturaleza del valor. Considerando la experiencia del aficionado serio 
(como distinta a la experiencia del jugador o del espectador casual), el trabajo sostiene que el 
deporte ilumina aspectos importantes de cómo valorar, desde el punto de la valoración, y de 
la propiedad de la valoración. Sostiene además, de una forma incluso más fundamental, que 
la experiencia del aficionado serio nos ayuda a apreciar las formas en las cuales la valoración 
es sí mismo un valor. 
Términos Clave: deporte, juego, valor, virtudes
1. Introduction
Why does sport matter? Does it? Perhaps, as is often claimed, sport can impart 
lessons  about  desirable  character  traits  of  broader  application  (such  as  discipline, 
perseverance,  teamwork,  etc.),  but  it  is  only  a  game.  Why  should  anyone  care  so 
intensely about winning or losing? The serious fan thinks it all matters in a way that is 
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grossly disproportionate to its actual significance. Sport is,  in the end, a “monstrous 
triviality.”1
Against this familiar skeptical challenge, the question I address here is: what is 
the value of being a serious fan? What could justify cheering in the way that such a fan 
does – investing, committing, and suffering through a favored team’s ups and downs 
and all the associated anguish? What, if anything, is he properly cheering? The answer 
extends, I think, beyond those that are most often proposed.   
The most prominent account of the value of sport claims that through training, 
practice,  and actual competition, players develop skills that strengthen prospects for 
success in business, personal relationships – in a range of areas. (Again, such traits as 
discipline, resilience, responsibility, pride, poise under pressure, strategic ingenuity, and 
many  others.)  For  spectators,  too,  the  qualities  witnessed  can  be  inspirational, 2
reminders of the rewards of cultivating such qualities in their own activities. Others 
have  claimed  other  benefits.  One  hypothesis  is  that  sport’s  artificial  structure 
crystallizes certain features found in our “real life” quests.  While the average adult is 3
normally enmeshed in the pursuit of multiple goals that may overlap in certain respects 
and vary greatly in their difficulty, duration, potential rewards and ramifications for 
other  goals,  sport  typically  offers  a  singular,  all-important  mission  which  must  be 
attained within fixed,  knowable rules  and a limited time period.  In contrast  to  the 4
frequently diffuse, blurry-bordered, hard-to-discern status of one’s personal assortment 
 Simon Barnes, The Meaning of Sport, London, Short Books, 2006, p. 14. Barnes proceeds to make plain his 1
own belief in the positive value of sport. 
 Scott Kretchmar usefully explores games (as opposed to play more broadly) as sharpening problem-2
solving skills in “The Normative Heights and Depths of Play,” Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 34, 2007, 
pp. 1-12.  
 See, for instance, Nick Hornby, Fever Pitch, New York: Penguin 1992, p. 168.  3
 The firmness of these features varies in different sports, of course. Judgment calls and style points have 4
greater sway in some than in others. For a broadly similar perspective, see Mark Edmundson, Why 
Football Matters – My Education in the Game, New York: Penguin, 2014, pp. 87-93 and 131-134. 
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of goals, many find a game’s self-contained clarity – decisive results, objective markers 
of progress throughout – therapeutic.  Others might emphasize the causality on display 5
in sport;  others, the justice;  still others, the sheer display of excellence and the pleasure 6 7
of admiration.8
Whatever the merit of these accounts (and I do think that each has merit), I do 
not think that they go far enough. What has not been appreciated is what sports can 
convey not  only  about  virtue,  but  about  value.  Because,  particularly  for  fans,  sport 
isolates the activity of valuing from any independent concern for the ends sought, it 
reveals the way in which valuing is itself a value. The fan’s experience illuminates facets 
 See Thomas Bowden, “In Praise of Spectator Sports,” The Objectivist Forum, August 1983, pp. 8-13. 5
 The idea is roughly that sport is a realm that is observably ruled by the law of identity. Events unfold by 6
and large according to the definite nature of the interacting factors. Players, balls, bats, goal posts, 
boundary markers, etc. can be counted on to maintain their identity and figure into the action 
accordingly. Chance and human error can inevitably also enter in, but planning is driven by the statistical 
probabilities; analyses are offered and strategies are devised based on scrutiny of the fundamental nature 
of the constants and the variables (e.g., this team’s personnel, that coach’s decision-making tendencies, 
that stadium’s windy conditions). The greater the role of chance in determining results, the less interest 
people seem to take in following a sport. (Ayn Rand observes the “metaphysical absolutism” that we rely 
on in chess and other games in “An Open Letter to Boris Spassky,” Philosophy: Who Needs It, New York: 
Bobbs Merrill, 1982, pp. 63, making related observations on 64, 65, 69.)
 While the best team does not necessarily win and officiating errors can victimize the superior performer, 7
sport’s construction of a demanding contest where success depends primarily on merit coupled with its 
evenhanded application of the rules to all participants reflect a commitment to the idea that people 
should receive their just deserts. Players earn roster spots and teams earn victories on the basis of 
objective measures of ability and performance. The rigorous training of referees and increasing adoption 
of precise measurement technologies, instant replay, and in-game appeals in the attempt to minimize the 
influence of chance error further testify to this devotion to justice. 
Within a wide literature on the general value of sport, for a sampler of different approaches and 
emphases, see Jan Boxill, “The Moral Significance of Sport,” Sports Ethics – An Anthology, ed. Boxill, 
Blackwell, 2003; Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, In Praise of Athletic Beauty, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2006; Stephen Mumford, "Allegiance and Identity," Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 31, 2004; Daniel 
Campos, “On the Value and Meaning of Football: Recent Philosophical Perspectives in Latin America,” 
Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 2010, 37, pp. 69-87. 
 A feature that some find common to the enjoyment of art and of sport. See, for instance, Denis Dutton, 8
The Art Instinct – Beauty, Pleasure, and Human Evolution, New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009, p. 53. 
Gumbrecht discusses this in In Praise of Athletic Beauty. For related thoughts, see Barnes pp. 28-35. 
Researchers in psychology have added claims of fandom’s benefits to mood and outlook. See those 
reported in Bill Morris, “One Way to Cheer Up: Cheer Harder,” New York Times, March 9, 2013.
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of how to value, the propriety of valuing, and the point of valuing. It especially exposes its 
affective dimension: the feeling involved in valuing. My aim here is not to prove these 
claims (which would require establishing the deepest foundations of meta-ethics), but 
to suggest that the skeptic who belittles sport as “only a game” prods us to appreciate 
important truths about the very phenomenon of value. My claims rely heavily on a 
definite theory of the basic nature of values. Yet even for those who do not share these 
premises, I think I can offer viable hypotheses about what we are cheering and why we 
should. 
Preliminaries 
Because  my  thesis  stands  upon  contested  presuppositions,  I  should  clarify 
several preliminaries. One cannot offer a compelling case for the value of a particular 
phenomenon, such as sport, without relying on premises concerning the nature of value 
more broadly, yet a full defense of those foundations would require a different paper 
entirely. Here, I will simply stipulate certain parameters and indicate the pivots in my 
argument’s scaffolding.
First, my subject is not players but fans, and only those of a particular type: the 
serious fan, who I distinguish from the casual fan or the occasional spectator who can 
enjoy a game if someone happens to suggest watching, but whose interest is fleeting 
and episodic. (I will use “fan” as a shorthand for this serious fan.)  The serious fan takes 9
an active interest in a team; he follows it by seeking out information afterwards about a 
game  he  is  unable  to  watch,  for  instance,  or  by  reading  analyses  or  listening  to 
commentary between games. He considers competing views of how the team should be 
run or the style of play it should adopt; he discusses these issues with others from time 
to time. While exact degrees of engagement can vary, the serious fan typically attends to 
 I will also use “team” as a shorthand to encompass whatever it is that a particular fan might be most 9
concerned with, be it a team or a particular sport or player. And some of my claims will apply to certain 
sports more readily than others, since structural and aesthetic features can affect the values involved. I 
will not pursue those differences here, however. 
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at  least  some  behind-the  scenes-activity  as  well  as  games  themselves,  concerning 
himself  with  such  things  as  coaching  staffs,  draft  selections,  injuries,  leagues’  rule 
changes.  More  broadly,  he  embraces  his  team’s  fortunes  as  an  ongoing  personal 
concern; its well-being becomes entwined with his own.  10
Second, I am presupposing the healthy fan, which does not deny that plenty of 
people are fanatics in the irrational sense of the term. Here,  I  will  bypass questions 
concerning the governing standard of health and simply stipulate that the healthy fan’s 
attitudes and conduct evince understanding of the relative value of sport in a well-led, 
flourishing life; he “has it in perspective.” His reactions are not violent; his identification 
with his team is not tribal. When his team disappoints, he does not vent his frustration 
by abusing his family or fall into a depressive funk for subsequent days. He is not a 
voyeur and does not attempt to live through his team; he pursues a suitable assortment 
of goals, roles, and activities for a person of his age and circumstances. The healthy fan 
does not peg his identity, his self-esteem, or the meaning of his existence on the fortunes 
of the Raiders or Manchester United.  11
It is especially important to understand the normative nature of my inquiry. I am 
examining not simply why sport appeals to many people, but why it should, that is, the 
 J.S. Russell discusses this in “The Ideal Fan or Good Fans?” Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 6, no. 1, 10
February 2012, p. 19. I should also distinguish the serious fan from the person who cares about a 
particular team’s success only, for instance, for as long as his nephew is a member of that team: once 
Scotty graduates, his interest in the Mighty Mites evaporates. In that kind of case, the rooting is more a 
manifestation of the fan’s support of Scotty. My subject is a different species: the fan committed to a team 
through transfigurations of its players and coaching staff, league re-alignment, and so on. This does not 
imply that the serious fan’s support is unconditional; certain actions by those affiliated with the team 
could alienate his affection. The point, though, is that the serious fan’s devotion is to a particular team as 
a good, rather than as a means or constituent of some independent value. Thanks to Scott Scheall for 
prodding me to consider this more circumscribed kind of fandom. For useful discussion of some of the 
larger issues here, see Nicholas Dixon, "The Ethics of Supporting Sports Teams," Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 18, 2001.
 By stipulating that my subject is the healthy fan, I am not presupposing that there is value in any 11
species of fan, for that would beg the paper’s question. I simply seek to clarify the type of fan whose 
value status is most worth examining. (Hooligans and misfits would be too easy a target.) 
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way in which it can be objectively valuable. While the two issues are closely related and 
while,  on my view, the appeal of sport does play a role in explaining its value,  the 
descriptive and prescriptive questions should not be conflated. Given that millions of 
people the world over devote a tremendous amount of  time,  energy,  and money to 
serious fandom, my question, essentially, is: Should they? Is that a legitimate pastime? A 
worthwhile use of a given fan’s resources? Correspondingly, I am not seeking to offer a 
causal explanation of why fans root as they do, nor to explain the motivations that lead 
people to pull for particular teams. Rather, I mean to explore: what is the good, if any, of 
their doing so?  
My discussion of this issue is complicated by the fact that part of the basis for 
fandom’s being good (when it is), I believe, lies in the fact that the fan enjoys sport and, 
presumably, is following it for that reason. This means that its value is not independent 
of a person’s desires and I thus cannot disown questions of motivation entirely. Personal 
ends are crucial to a thing’s objective value. Nonetheless,  an individual’s taste for a 
given object or activity does not by itself render that object good (in the sense of its being 
objectively valuable). Thus the distinction between descriptive analysis and inquiry into 
prescriptive value remains critical. 
At the same time, while sport does offer objective value, in my view, it remains 
an optional value; a given person’s life is not morally deficient, without it. The decision 
of whether or not to follow sport is legitimately a matter of taste: it is morally permitted, 
but not required. Life offers many pursuits that are objectively valuable for those who 
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enjoy that kind of thing. Whittling is not for me, as bird watching may not be for you.  12
Sport fandom falls in this category.13
Finally, I should underscore that none of this denies the existence of fans who 
embrace  or  manifest  their  allegiances  in  inappropriate  ways  that  are  antithetical  to 
objective values.  Moreover,  many fans are mixed specimens on a spectrum between 
paradigms of health and disease, exhibiting varying complements of constructive and 
destructive elements. I posit the model of a healthy fan simply to explore what value 
fandom, in its best form, can bring to a person’s life.  14
Let me now address a few more substantive suppositions concerning values. 
 Moreover, fandom is not necessarily an objective value for anyone who is a fan, given the possibility of 12
irrational forms of fandom. An objective value is (roughly) that which is, in fact, beneficial to an 
individual’s life. Certain things can be objectively valuable for some people without being valuable to 
others because of variations in particular individuals’ needs and ends. Insulin or beta-blockers might be 
valuable to people with certain illnesses but not to those without those conditions. Beneath such variable 
values and setting the boundaries of what could qualify as objectively valuable for a particular 
individual, however, are the most basic conditions of all human life. I shall explain this a bit further, 
shortly. For a much fuller explanation of optional values and of objective value, see Leonard Peikoff, 
Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, New York: Penguin, 1991, pp. 323-324, 241-249; Tara Smith, Viable 
Values – A Study of Life as the Root and Reward of Morality, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, pp. 
99-101, 127-128, 146; and Tara Smith, Ayn Rand’s Normative Ethics – The Virtuous Egoist, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 27, 30, 190 note # 30. 
 The value that I am attributing to sport in a serious fan’s life need not be self-conscious; the fan is not 13
necessarily aware of the value that I posit. Fans are not closet philosophers who pass the breaks between 
innings immersed in deep reflection on the metaphysical implications of their afternoon at the ballpark. A 
person need not understand the mechanics of values in his life in order to benefit from them. My subject 
is the fan’s experience of fandom, rather than his thoughts about his fandom.
 Note that my project is not to directly engage the question, recently discussed by others, of who 14
constitutes the ideal fan: the purist, the partisan, or a hybrid. (For the most pointed discussion of this, see 
Dixon, "The Ethics of Supporting Sports Teams," and Russell, “The Ideal Fan or Good Fans?” pp. 11-23.) 
Insofar as my focus is on the kind of fan who cares passionately about the success of his team, it might be 
thought that I support the partisan as the ideal type, but that is not entailed by anything in my discussion 
and I do not wish to take a stand on that question here. Russell has raised good reason to question the 
very notion of an ideal fan. [Russell, p. 12] By clarifying the kind of “serious fan” who I am discussing 
here, I mean simply to distinguish my subject from more casual fans and from unhealthy fans (who might 
be motivated by either purist or partisan preferences). Insofar as my focus is on the more partisan-
inclined, however, my analysis of the value of fandom, even if it proves sound, may need to be 
supplemented by accounts of the value of other types of fandom.
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I am grounding all of this on the moral theory of Ayn Rand’s rational egoism. 
While I cannot take the time to defend that theory here, I should indicate its essentials 
simply to orient the reader.  15
Rand’s egoism holds that a person should act to promote his self-interest. His 
well-being is his highest good and, properly, the primary aim of his actions. The basis 
for this rests in the fact that the very phenomenon of value is rooted in living organisms’ 
need to achieve certain ends in order to sustain their lives. That literal, existential need 
creates the imperative for identifying that which is good for an organism and that which 
is bad for it. If a human being seeks to live, he must act in the manner that his nature 
dictates in order to achieve that end.  16
A value, on this account, is that which one acts to gain and/or keep.  Values 17
span a wide range of ends – intellectual, social, emotional, as well as material. Bread, 
bicycles,  education,  confidence,  a  career,  a  marriage,  or  music could all  qualify.  The 
standard of value is life:  that which furthers a person’s life is objectively good; that 
which imperils or impairs it is bad.  The reason for caring about values is their impact 18
 I elaborate much more extensively on this theoretical foundation in Viable Values – A Study of Life as the 15
Root and Reward of Morality, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. 
 The “if” in this statement is crucial. The existence of value is conditional on a living organism’s seeking 16
to exist. And because, in the case of human beings, that seeking and the requisite actions are volitional, no 
set of facts can unilaterally create values. For much more on this, see Rand, “The Objectivist Ethics,” The 
Virtue of Selfishness, New York: Signet, 1961, pp. 13-39, and “Causality vs. Duty,” Philosophy: Who Needs It, 
pp. 118-119; Peikoff, Objectivism, pp. 241-249, 206-220; Smith, Viable Values, pp. 93-95; Smith, Ayn Rand’s 
Normative Ethics, pp. 19-23; and Smith, "The Importance of the Subject in Objective Morality: 
Distinguishing Objective from Intrinsic Value," Social Philosophy & Policy 25, no. 1, 2008, pp. 126-148. Note 
that this is of a piece with Kretchmar’s emphasis on games as centrally concerned with problem-solving, 
an ability that is beneficial to human beings because it is necessary for the species’ survival. See 
Kretchmar, “Normative Heights,” pp. 3, 9. 
 Rand, "The Objectivist Ethics," p. 16. 17
 Virtues name the types of actions or action-associated traits and dispositions that, as a kind, typically 18
fuel the achievement of values. Such qualities as honesty, justice, independence, and productiveness are 
among the moral virtues that Rand recognizes. See Rand, “The Objectivist Ethics,” pp. 27-28. For 
elaboration on the fundamental virtues of rational egoism, see Rand, Atlas Shrugged, New York: Dutton, 
1992 edition (orig. 1957), pp. 1018-1020; Peikoff, chapter 8; and Smith, Ayn Rand’s Normative Ethics.
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on that person’s life and happiness.  Thus a particular end might be a value in the 19
descriptive, subjective sense that I act to gain it without being an objective value, since 
the object of my action is not necessarily in my genuine interest. Correspondingly, when 
Rand commends “self-interest,” she is referring to a person’s actual, objective interest. 
Her rational egoism should not be confused with psychological egoism, subjectivism, 
hedonism, materialism, or predatory exploitation.20
With  this  framework  in  place,  let’s  turn  more  directly  to  the  value  of  sport 
fandom. My discussion proceeds in four phases, considering sport’s illumination of how 
to value, the propriety of valuing, and the point of valuing; it then draws lessons about 
exactly what we are cheering.  
2. How to Value: Better to Have Loved and Lost …  
Given that a value is something that a person acts to acquire (or preserve), the 
pursuit of values requires both the selection of a specific end and correlative action, to 
achieve it. While value-pursuit thus unites the efforts of mind and body, it also involves 
 Rand’s view is broadly Aristotelian. “Life” refers to more than sheer bodily or biological survival and 19
encompasses happiness, as gauged by that same standard. See my explanation of this relationship in 
Viable Values, pp. 125-151. 
 Importantly, Rand rejects the zero-sum model of human relationships in which one person’s gains 20
necessarily entail another person’s loss. In this respect, life is quite different from a competitive athletic 
contest. For more on this, see Smith, Ayn Rand’s Normative Ethics, pp. 38-46; Viable Values, pp. 174.-186; and 
"Reconsidering Zero-Sum Value:  It's How You Play the Game," Journal of Social Philosophy 28, no. 2 (Fall 
1997), pp. 128-139.
Separately, one might suspect that on the view that values are that which a person acts to gain or 
keep, the comparative passivity of a fan could not qualify. Vehemently as he might (from his sofa) implore 
the squad to “stiffen up” or to “be careful with the ball, goddammit,” these astute instructions go 
unheeded by the team; the fan makes no active contribution to the outcome that he desires. (Leave aside 
possible contributions of home crowd cheers, when he is actually attending a game.) This conclusion 
would be hasty, however. While the fan who I am contemplating obviously does not undertake the same 
sorts of activities as the players (learning plays, training, executing the block or the bunt, and so on), he 
does engage in the actions of a fan – clearing his calendar for the relevant hours to watch a game, tuning 
in, buying tickets, reading, analyzing, emotionally investing, etc.
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a person’s spirit.  The fan’s experience helps us to appreciate that valuing is not merely 21
a  sequence  of  intellectual  selection  followed  by  mechanical  execution,  the  physical 
performance of the requisite deeds. Valuing is visceral, as well. It is felt in the marrow.
In sport, people care – often passionately. The greatest players are driven. Their 
commitment is consuming and self-defining; it penetrates to the core of who they are 
(which is the reason why they strain to press hundreds of pounds, rise at 4:30 to run up 
and down stadium stairs,  and train with exacting fitness  gurus throughout  the  off-
season).  Yet  it  is  the  fan’s  relative  passivity  that  particularly  exposes  the  affective 
dimension of valuing. Although the fan simply watches (it is the players who act  to 
secure victory),  he takes great  satisfaction in caring:  anticipating,  analyzing,  hoping, 
fretting – in being invested emotionally as well as intellectually. 
The virtues that we admire in the best performers – discipline, resilience, and the 
rest – are themselves animated by players’ desires. Without desire, a person would exert 
no such effort. Desire is not important solely for its motivational role, however, as a 
catalyst to successful action. Desire is also important because it feels good. The wanting 
in itself is worthwhile.  22
Sport fans care deeply about outcomes beyond our control and divorced from 
real life consequences. Don’t we have better things to invest our time and money in? 
Our energy and emotion? Serious fans experience intense elation and dejection. The 
emotional  reverberations  penetrate.  Why  subject  ourselves  to  that,  given  the 
insignificance of the stakes, if not for the fun of it? Yet: is its being fun (as it is, for some 
of us) simply our perversity? People get kicks from all sorts of things, after all …
 I do not mean anything mystical by “spirit,” but simply those aspects of a person’s experience that 21
pertain to his mind or consciousness, such as his thoughts, feelings, moods, attitudes, or what we 
sometimes refer to as his emotional life or psychological condition. 
 This is not true of all desires or of wanting per se. The status of the desire to relieve a pain, for example, 22
is more complex. My immediate point concerns only the desire involved in playing and rooting in sport.
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I think not. Part of what makes it fun, I would suggest, is its implicit affirmation 
of a truth: it is right to care. Caring, in principle, is a good thing. It is so not because it is 
enjoyable; clearly, caring entails suffering, at times, as when the object of one’s concern 
does not advance as well as one hopes. Caring itself is valuable, however, in that it is a 
prerequisite  for  goal-directed  action.  Regardless  of  whether  one’s  ends  are  egoistic, 
altruistic, utilitarian, egalitarian, or aimed at other diverse goals, a person will not be 
motivated to  take  the  action  that  any end demands  unless  he  truly  cares  about  its 
achievement.  And because caring is  also vital  for  sustaining purposeful  action over 
time, it is a prerequisite of efficacy: a person’s efforts are likely to be half-hearted or 
easily abandoned unless the outcome matters to him. (Thus our common disparagement 
of the “indifferent” worker.)
My immediate point about fans is that part of what explains the fun of a fan’s 
commitment is its reflection of the fact that it is right to care. And more: it is right to care 
wholeheartedly, unreservedly, surrendering oneself emotionally to the fortunes of his 
ends in the way that the serious fan does. When a person pursues various values, he 
should pursue them like he means it. This both deepens his potential enjoyment of values 
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and best positions him to succeed; it is the mode that is most conducive to the actual 
achievement and full realization of worthwhile ends.   23
In a properly self-interested ethics, purposeful, value-pursuing action is a central 
value. Seeking is not an end in itself, however; goal-directed action is not busy–work. It 
is goal-directed action. The point of pursuing specific goals is to achieve ends that the 
agent believes will contribute to his overall well-being and that he wants. It is in this 
way that valuing is something that we feel as well as something that we choose and do. 
To put the point in slightly different terms: a person’s success at achieving his ends is 
not a matter of earning credit for a performance; it is not a perspective on his experience. 
It  is  a  quality  of  and  in  his  experience  (as  is  suggested  by  the  distinctly  agreeable 
atmosphere  that  success  typically  creates,  the  good  feeling  it  rinses  over  us).  An 
objective value in a person’s life is not an externally imposed duty that he is obligated to 
fulfill. Properly, for a given person, an objective value is three-dimensional: the person 
judges rationally that he should go after this end (read this book, apply for that job, ask 
out that woman); he does go after it, through action; he wants to go after it. Or more 
precisely, he wants it. The fact that sports fans want ferociously without being engaged 
in the actions that can achieve their ends especially helps us to appreciate this. 
 In evolutionary terms, it is reasonable to suppose that human beings are “built” to enjoy caring because 23
our survival depends on caring and on the actions that manifest it. In this general vein, Kretchmar has 
argued that it is in human nature to seek out artificial tests and that engaging with games’ challenges 
carries evolutionary benefits. “Why Do We Care So Much About Mere Games? (And Is This Ethically 
Defensible?)” Quest 57, 2005, p. 183.
I am assuming in this paragraph that the values in question are rational values for the person in 
question, that they appropriate to his capacities, resources, and higher ends. Also, I suspect that many 
fans subconsciously recognize the propriety of fully committing to ends and that this underwrites their 
permitting themselves to indulge in this ostensibly useless enterprise. For related observations 
concerning a fan’s surrender, see Steve Almond, “An Agreement to Live in a State of Powerlessness,” New 
York Times Magazine, August 26, 2012, pp. 56-57. Simon Barnes also discusses this. “Sport depends on your 
ability to believe in it. You must believe that sport is important, while knowing all along that it is nothing 
of the kind. You must keep sport in perspective, yes, but you still have to believe in it. Or, more 
accurately, you have to suspend your disbelief,” Barnes, p. 89. For his principal thoughts on appropriate 
caring alongside “keeping it in perspective” as well as on the innocence and emotional vulnerability of 
fandom, see Barnes, pp. 87, 89, and 194-199. 
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So, my thought is, like the fan: feel it. Inhabit that desire. It is good to feel it. It is 
healthy. It is life-advancing.  The way to value is wholeheartedly, releasing oneself into 24
the emotion of it – both because that is what motivates the actions necessary to achieve 
objective values and because it feels good.  25
Why does its  feeling good,  though,  render it  worthwhile  (even partially)?  To 
answer, and to underwrite the propriety of valuing in this way, we must consider the 
point of valuing.  
3. The Point of Valuing: For the Fun of It  
Why should a person value things? 
Essentially, because he must. 
Briefly: a person has needs which, if left unsatisfied, will result in his demise. 
Human beings’ existence is not a metaphysical given, eternally assured, and our actions 
do  not  spontaneously  meet  our  needs.  We  must  figure  out  the  conditions  of  our 26
existence,  means  of  satisfying  them,  and  then  take  the  requisite  actions.  We  must 
 We cannot  direct  our  emotions,  of  course,  ordering up specific feelings  on demand.  Emotions are 24
automatized  responses  to  external  stimuli  that  reflect  a  person’s  underlying  values  and  beliefs. 
Nonetheless, people do often repress their feelings, attempting to muffle their power or to deny them 
access  to  the  surface  of  full  awareness,  so  as  to  resist  feeling  them.  Given  this,  recognition  that 
experiencing the feel of our values is part of what it means to truly value things may encourage us to 
loosen  the  locks  of  repression.  And that,  in  turn,  can  have  the  salutary  effect  of  encouraging  fuller 
examination of one’s feelings’ sources and of our decisions that are influenced by them. For more on the 
basic nature of emotions, see Paolo Costa, “A Secular Wonder,” in George Levine, ed., The Joy of Secularism 
– 11 Essays for How We Live Now, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011, p. 144; Smith, Ayn Rand’s 
Normative Ethics, pp. 70-73; Paul E. Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1997); Robert C. Solomon, ed., Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Patricia Greenspan, Emotions and Reasons  (New York: Routledge, 
1988). 
 Each and every episode within the course of valuing an end will not necessarily feel good; I am 25
speaking of the experience as a whole. Also, this does not imply that a person should express his feelings 
with the same ferocity in all situations. 
 Certain life-sustaining actions (such as breathing and digesting) are genetically coded to occur without 26
conscious effort, but critical others are not. For human beings, the acquisition of food, clothing, shelter, 
medicine, and knowledge require deliberate effort. For elaboration, see Rand "The Objectivist Ethics;" 
Peikoff, pp. 193-198; and Smith, Ayn Rand’s Normative Ethics, chapter 3. 
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identify hunger pangs, for instance, as hunger pangs – indications of a need that can be 
satisfied by ingesting certain substances and not others – and proceed to obtain the 
appropriate  foods.  While  our  needs  are  of  differing  types,  scope,  and urgency,  this 
principle holds for all of them: human beings must act in specific ways to achieve the 
values that are necessary to sustain us. It is a fact of our nature. A person should value 
certain things because he must.
“Musts” only take us so far, however. All “musts” are relational: I must … for the 
sake of something else. (I must get my application in by the deadline if I want to be eligible 
for the grant; I must save money now if I am to have adequate savings to pay for the 
vacation  I’d  like  this  summer.)  Ultimately,  all  “musts”  are  grounded  in  a  basic 
conditional: a human being must value certain things if he is to live.  Why should he 27
want that? Here, reasons of the usual sort run out; the answer is of a different order. 
(Indeed, one’s answer is  what creates the need for reasons in every other sphere of 
action.)
Why should a person seek to live? 
Because he thinks he’ll enjoy it. Because he wants it. He likes living. It pleases 
him. 
A person holds no inherent duty to maintain his life; he is under no divinely 
imposed obligation to be.  Yet if, fundamentally, a person does wish to live, then it is 
crucial for him to recognize that certain paths will further that end and certain paths 
will work against it. This is the foundation of objective values. And this is why a person 
needs a moral code of values to guide him to the kinds of actions that will promote his 
well-being. 
What all  values are for,  fundamentally,  is  the agent himself  and his ability to 
enjoy the life that he seeks. Sport, by virtue of its artificiality and insulation – the fact 
that its goals are contrived and inconsequential for “real life” (my paycheck is no larger, 
 See note # 16 above. 27
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my cholesterol no lower, and my marriage no richer, when my team wins) – brings this 
out in a particularly powerful way.  28
Some dismiss sport as “only” a game because it seems pointless, in the larger 
scheme of things. In relation to many things, it  is.  I  am not defending enjoyment of 
sport as the highest value in a rational person’s life; many other things should often 
take precedence. Yet there is something importantly right in the very frivolity of it, in 
the sheer fact that a person enjoys it and that it does not serve some further, “worthier” 
end. Enjoyment does not always need a reason. Enjoyment does not need permission. It 
is the ultimate reason why other things do need reasons: How will they affect my well-
being? – a central artery of which is: my enjoyment, my elemental enjoyment of being. 
(In a like vein, Simon Barnes speculates on sports mattering precisely because it doesn't 
matter.)29
The  characterization  of  something  as  “only”  a  game  clearly  implies  its 
inadequacy. The activity, it declares, requires justification. The typical way to redeem 
sport’s value is by reference to its professed benefits for other realms, the ways it can 
foster qualities that are useful in business or personal relationships. Yet we can equally 
ask of sport’s service to other realms: and what makes those good? Consider our similar 
evaluations in other realms: “It’s  only money.” “It’s only a job.” “It’s only a broken 
arm.” “It’s only a girlfriend.”
What isn't “only”? 
 As others have observed, it is characteristic of sport that players perform actions not for their expected 28
instrumental value, but for their own sake. In his classic The Grasshopper – Games, Life and Utopia, for 
instance, Bernard Suits observes that “Playing a game is the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary 
obstacles.” (Suits, The Grasshopper, Toronto: Broadview Press, 2005 edition, p. 55, emphasis added; 
originally published 1978). This naturally raises the question: What good is that? Doesn't life pose enough 
actual hardships? Kretchmar addresses this question in full light of poverty, disease, war, and the like, in 
“Why Do We Care So Much About Mere Games?” While Kretchmar’s concern is with games’ value to the 
player more than to the observer, some of the value that he discerns could be easily seen to arise for fans, 
as well.
 Barnes, p. 9. 29
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To regard something as relatively insignificant presupposes a standard of value. 
What  is  that  standard? And what  is  its  claim to our allegiance? The value of  sport 
(however much or little that is, in the end) depends upon the source of value, more 
broadly. While the full engagement of that question lies beyond my purview here, the 
pertinent  thought  is  this:  Given  that,  at  the  base  of  all  objective  values  stands  the 
individual’s desire for living, essentially, just because he likes it, the engaged sports fan, 
in surrendering himself so wholly to the enjoyment of valuing, is doing something that 
is not so different in kind and that is not in need of a special justification. His devotion 
reflects the truth that all values are just for the fun of it. Ultimately, life is for the fun of it. 
Lest I be misunderstood: To say that values are “just for the fun of it” is not to 
imply that the test of whether a particular thing is a value is the question: would I have 
fun doing this? Similarly, my claim that “at the base of all objective values stands the 
individual’s desire for living, essentially, just because he likes it” does not entail that 
liking is the ultimate standard of value. My point, rather, is to recognize that part of the 
reason for a person to pursue values and to care about morality is the fact that he seeks 
to flourish, that he desires living. And the reason that he does, typically, is his anticipated 
enjoyment of living.  30
Rational egoism does not entail hedonism. These claims about the significance of 
enjoyment do not mean that a person should (or could) pursue exclusively pleasurable 
activities. In order for a person to achieve his ongoing happiness, he must meet all sorts 
of  practical  needs  by  means  that  are  not  uniformly  enjoyable  (scrubbing  the  pots, 
discarding the rubbish, etc.). Yet to deny oneself hours that are themselves, essentially, 
simply for  pleasure would miss  the point  of  pursuing all  the  other  “more worthy” 
 Bear in mind the different levels on which a person enjoys things. Many people sincerely enjoy 30
challenging careers, for example, without enjoying every constituent moment of the careful study, the 
difficult decisions, uncertainties, pressure, etc., that they demand. Many people enjoy the flavors of the 
rich dessert without enjoying their attendant awareness of its caloric toll.
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pursuits. Those cannot be more worthy if the source of their worthiness is the enjoyment 
of one’s life – and if he sacrifices that enjoyment for their sake. 
To be clear: In a particular hour, it could be more appropriate that a person forgo 
the pleasure of a ballgame to tend other needs or a particular need’s urgency. The fact 
that the desire for pleasure plays an integral role in the generation of values does not 
entail that every opportunity for pleasure trumps every opportunity to advance a value 
other  than  pleasure.  Enjoyment’s  value  has  limits  –  for  the  egoistic  reason  that 
enjoyment is  not a reliable test  of  what is  genuinely in a person’s interest.  Rational 
egoism rejects hedonism because it recognizes that pleasure is not a sound measure of 
human well-being.  31
  My point,  however,  is  that to deny oneself  pleasure as a matter of  policy –
routinely to subordinate enjoyment to more instrumentally useful tasks on the premise 
that “sport is only fun; it isn't worthy” – would invert ends and means, treating means 
as intrinsically valuable and forgetting what they are for and what gives them value.  32
4. The Propriety of Valuing: The Fan’s Implicit Egoism  
The propriety of valuing is tightly entwined with the point of valuing. In our 
society, self-sacrifice is widely presumed to be the moral good. “The measure of our 
character is our willingness to give of ourselves to others.” While the words were John 
Kerry’s in 2004, the sentiment is confidently expressed by a long trail of political leaders 
from across the ideological spectrum (e.g., George Bush senior and son, Mitt Romney, 
 Russell’s discussion of extreme sports brings out the fact that enjoyment is not a sufficient criterion of 31
value. See “The Value of Dangerous Sport,” Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 32, 2005, pp. 1-19.
 The fact that enjoyment of one’s life is pivotal to the birth of objective values in a person’s life does not 32
render enjoyment the standard of value. Nor does it equate value or happiness with that which produces 
the highest possible peak on a pleasure-meter in any given hour. For more on the relationship between 
the purpose of value and the standard of value, see Rand, "The Objectivist Ethics," pp. 27 and 31-33; 
Peikoff, pp. 213-220; and Smith, Viable Values, chapter 5; and Ayn Rand’s Normative Ethics, pp. 28-33. 
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Barack Obama), who routinely call on Americans to “give back to the community.”  33
Commencement  speakers  from all  walks  of  life  (novelists,  inventors,  film directors, 
entrepreneurs)  annually  urge  college  graduates  to  use  their  education  to  serve 
something  “larger  than  themselves.”  Conservatives  and  Progressives  increasingly 
champion mandatory national service;  Michelle Obama lectures that “service is the 34
rent we pay for living.”  35
Against  this  background,  sport  is  a  sanctuary  in  which  participants  are 
encouraged to pursue their  own interested ends.  It  is  widely accepted that  when it 
comes to the athletic arena, the proper way to play or to root is to commit to your side 
full-throttle, unshakably and unapologetically. It is this type of steadfast dedication that 
drives the most successful players to take the countless actions that contribute to their 
success. Our standards for fans, too, expect unwavering devotion. The fair-weather fan 
is, by definition, not a good fan. The true fan wouldn't think of rooting for a rival; the 
idea is inconceivable. (I have heard of many inventive forms of Lenten sacrifice, but 
never this. Could a true-blue Red Sox fan root for the Yankees? To suggest that he could 
would reveal a complete failure to understand who that person is.)36
 One hears it often from political figures, I think, precisely because it is not perceived as controversial; it 33
is a safe applause line.
 Senator John McCain, General Stanley McChrystal, and Arianna Huffington are among its well known 34
supporters. See Huffington praising it from the National Service Summit 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/arianna-huffington/franklin-project-national-service_b_3492226.html 
or the website of Americorps: http://www.nationalservice.gov/programs/americorps
 Michelle Obama, Commencement address given at University of California, Merced in the spring of 35
2009. Mrs Obama was quoting  Marian Wright Edelman – transcript at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/16/us/politics/16text-michelle.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
 I leave aside, obviously, rooting for a rival for instrumental reasons, such as when its victory in a 36
particular game would benefit one’s own team’s playoff eligibility. Russell’s observation that a fan’s 
ongoing support of a team is not so much a matter of loyalty to something regarded as an external, 
independent good, as a matter of the fan’s self-identity, is of a piece with this. See Russell, “The Ideal Fan 
or Good Fans?” p. 19.  
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Firm commitment to any of one’s ends has its value, one might agree, but why 
should a person care so fervently about something this inconsequential? The answer, I 
think, helps us to home in on the egoism of valuing.
Most people’s allegiances in sport are, at base, arbitrary. While some fans adopt 
teams for philosophical reasons (a team owner’s religious or political affiliations, for 
instance,  or a school’s  policies on student athletes),  the vast  majority “inherit” their 
teams from a city or family or other happenstance.  (“We Sheehan’s have always pulled 37
for Newcastle.”) Moreover, this is regarded as perfectly reasonable. “Because I grew up 
in Pittsburgh” is a silly reason to adopt religious conclusions; it is the epitome of reason, 
in explaining devotion to the Steelers. So, the question is: Why indulge these arbitrary 
preferences and applaud such fierce devotion to them?  38
Our doing so, I think, reflects recognition that a person’s life is an end in itself 
and that it is right for him to treat it as all–important, as his highest good. That is, by 
accepting that the reasons for his devotion need rest no further than the fact that he 
wants this team’s success – by treating that desire as all the justification he needs – we 
are implicitly affirming the propriety of his achieving what he seeks for no purpose 
other than his enjoyment of that. We are endorsing his enjoyment as an end in itself, 
 Cf. Hornby, p. 127. 37
 Strictly, preferences are neither arbitrary nor non-arbitrary; it is conclusions or decisions that can be 38
assessed by that metric. Frequently, a decision is rendered arbitrary because it is based on an 
inappropriate indulgence of personal preference. Yet in some circumstances, indulging a preference is 
perfectly reasonable (such as in choosing a flavor of ice cream, other things being equal). What is 
important for my purposes is the fact that the serious fan acts on the basis of sheer preference. And in this 
arena, we regard as adequate reason for action the kind of reason that in many other contexts would be 
distinctly inappropriate (such as in hiring decisions or choosing a course of medical treatment for a 
serious illness). Again: Why indulge these arbitrary preferences and applaud such fierce devotion to 
them?
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crediting  personal  gratification  in  a  way that  altruism could  not  abide.  Egoism is 39
allowed, in sport. Indeed, it is encouraged.  40
Note the intensity of the serious fan’s emotional responses to his team’s fortunes 
– the deep dejection, the celestial soar produced by triumph in the big games. Sport 
carries an astonishing power to seize a person’s global sense of well-being, of whether 
things  are  fundamentally  right  with  the  world.  Many  fans  testify  that  all-out 41
emotional  investment  is  part  of  what  they  enjoy,  well  aware  that  episodes  of 
disappointment  may  outnumber  those  of  triumph.  When  they  tamp  down  their 
engagement  (“watching”  a  game  while  really  doing  other  things,  for  instance,  or 
deliberately detaching emotionally,  so as  not  to  be “burned again”),  the returns are 
diminished. Rooting – and rooting wholeheartedly, along with the surrender to fortune 
that that entails – is much of what makes sport rewarding.  42
My suggestion is that this strength of emotional response stems from the unusually 
personal,  self-interested quality of  the desire.  It  is  precisely the fact  that  the games’ 
outcomes do not matter to the larger framework of “real” values that allows us to see – 
and allows the fan to feel – how nakedly it is him, and his getting what he seeks, that are 
 To regard something as an end in itself is not to attribute intrinsic value to it. For full explanation, see 39
my "Intrinsic Value: Look-Say Ethics," Journal of Value Inquiry 32, no. 4, December 1998, pp. 539-553. For 
clarification more specifically of the difference between objective value and intrinsic value, see my "The 
Importance of the Subject in Objective Morality: Distinguishing Objective from Intrinsic Value," Social 
Philosophy & Policy 25, no. 1, 2008, pp. 126-148. 
 That athletic success is routinely celebrated in formal award ceremonies, the annual issuing of 40
prestigious All-Star lists, and select players’ installation into Halls of Fame all testify to the considerable 
dignity that society accords to these pursuits, pointless though they may be in conventional utilitarian 
terms. 
 Hornby is especially good at capturing this; see pp. 217-223 for his account of an emotional trajectory 41
with which many fans will identify. 
 Barnes addresses this calibration of investment on pp. 167 ff. Also note that this bears certain affinities 42
with Russell’s claims that human being are meaning-seeking animals who find meaning in the sorts of 
narratives and self-identifying attachments that sport fandom can offer. See Russell, “Ideal Fans…,” p. 
16-19.
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on the line.  There is  a piercing “mine-ness” to my team,  a  wholeness and unfiltered 
purity to my identification with it. That is why the team’s success or failure registers 
with such profound, percussive impact. (Some part of every person is subconsciously 
aware, I would speculate, that he must seek his own well-being and that behind and 
through many of the specific objects he seeks, he is seeking what he deems beneficial for 
him. Note: “Many” of his actions and their objects, not all; I am not retreating from my 
rejection of psychological egoism. People obviously often act in ways detrimental to 
their interest – sometimes accidentally, sometimes deliberately. Many believe that they 
should subordinate their interests to those of others. My point is that sport is an enclave 
in  which players  and fans  alike  are  liberated to  pursue their  perceived self-interest 
without apology. And my conjecture is that that egoism is much of why it feels right, to 
fans.)
Earlier,  I  argued that  the point  of  valuing is  personal  enjoyment.  Beneath all 
other why’s and wherefore’s, ultimately, “just because I like it” stands as the most basic 
reason why one should pursue or do anything; that desire is pivotal to the existence of 
values.  Sport offers a vibrant illustration of this. Further, though, it is an instance of it. 43
Much as we might draw lessons from sport about virtues and values that carry 
useful application to other realms, an implication of what I have been arguing is that 
sport offers value in itself. Sport is not merely a metaphor or a proxy for “real” life; it is 
not simply a laboratory or a rehearsal space, offering instruction for the parts of life that 
matter.  It  is  life,  consuming this  June  afternoon or  that  fall  ‘08  season of  the  finite 
interval of which a particular fan’s life is made. And if a person enjoys that – not in a 
way that impairs his ability to achieve other things that objectively matter more for his 
 To be clear, the fact that desire is “pivotal” to the existence of values does not mean that it is sufficient, 43
or that the sheer experience of desire by itself confers value on the object sought or the desire itself. A 
person’s “likes” are not value-generators on a like-by-like basis. The purpose-standard distinction noted 
above is crucial. Correspondingly, I should not be read as implying that all desires are, by nature, egoistic. 
Who it is that wants something and what it is that a person wants are distinct questions, and the egoism of 
a pursuit depends on the latter – more exactly, on what is sought and on why it is sought. 
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overall well-being and subject to all the conditions set by the standard of value – then 
that is a good. That is valuable. We are all “on the clock,” after all. As one sage fan has 
observed, sport may not be real life, but it isn't make-believe, either.44
Sport  does impart  lessons that  apply to many spheres  of  human activity.  Yet 
among the truths it affirms is that, quite simply, enjoyment matters. Indeed, the desire 
to enjoy is what makes “mattering:” it gives rise to the possibility of anything’s being 
objectively a value, or “required,” or “right” for a person. Correspondingly, sport is a 
value (for those who enjoy it), in one important respect, just because they do.  45
This  is  the  quiet  wisdom  of  the  serious  fan.  His  experience  (however 
unwittingly) displays important aspects of how to value, of the point of valuing, and of 
the propriety of valuing. A person must invest in his ends wholeheartedly in order to 
act as required to attain them and more, in order to enjoy them. What the fanatic gets 
right is that this  is the way to care and to go after things: unabashedly, passionately, 
heart and soul – and that this is the way to experience them. A person should value not 
only because his existence depends on it, but because his enjoyment depends on it. That 
is his reason for being.
 Scott Simon, Home and Away – Memoirs of a Fan, New York: Hyperion, 2000, p. 38.  44
 In an appraisal of the likely lasting effects on London of having hosted the 2012 Summer Olympics, an 45
Economist column is duly philosophical: “Longevity is not the only measure of value: Usain Bolt won the 
100 meters in under ten seconds, but those seconds were quite exciting. The life of a country, like a 
person’s, is made up of moments, and the golden ones can be cherished even if they change nothing.” 
“Glory and Hope” (Bagehot column; no author given), The Economist, August 11, 2012, p. 52. For broader 
philosophical probing of the role of enjoyment in value, see Harry Frankfurt, The Importance of What We 
Care About, 1988, and John Kekes, Enjoyment – The Moral Significance of Styles of Life, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008.
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The propriety of valuing, then, rests in its egoism. Valuing serves the purpose for 
which  the  phenomenon  of  value  arises,  namely:  each  individual’s  well-being.  His 
happiness.  46
(My contention, it should be clear, is not that sport implies egoism because the 
character traits that it fosters are egoistic. Many of those traits are useful for efficacy in 
achieving  a  variety  of  goals,  not  exclusively  self-interested  ones.  The  egoism  is 
entrenched, rather, at a deeper level, in the sanctioned pursuit of such a conventionally 
useless end. Seeking one team’s success in the way that the serious fan does, given that 
such success will promote no independent value in anyone’s life, honors the pursuit of 
selfish pleasure as an end in itself. Investing in an outcome for no reason beyond your 
fancy is an extravagant expenditure of energy that could only be sanctioned by the fact 
that you enjoy it. That is what bespeaks egoism. Egoism is implicit in the reasons that 
underwrite  the  legitimacy  of  the  pursuit,  in  other  words,  rather  than  in  the  skills 
conducive to success at that pursuit {though many of the same skills will be important 
to successful egoism}.)
5. Cheering 
 Colin McGinn, in a book that focuses on playing sport rather than the fan’s experience, sounds a 46
similar theme at one stage, but he offers little explanation. See McGinn, Sport, 2008, Stocksfield, England: 
Acumen, p. 102.
Many fans enjoy the sense of belonging and camaraderie that they derive from fandom; by 
adopting a certain team, they affiliate themselves with a group of people who are often passionate about 
the same end and whose company can enhance their own experience. (For discussion of this aspect of 
fandom, see, for instance, Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Dorrance Kelly, All Things Shining, New York, Free 
Press, 2011, pp. 190-202, and Michael Chabon, Manhood for Amateurs, New York: Harper Collins, 2009, pp. 
293-297.) These facts are perfectly compatible with the egoism of sport. For rational egoism is neither 
solipsistic nor anti-social and the enjoyment of an activity is not one and the same as the self-interest of 
that activity, since enjoyment is not the standard of interest (as I explained earlier). The egoism of fandom, 
accordingly, does not turn on whether a given fan enjoys following his team more in the company of 
others or in solitude (as some fans prefer, particularly for watching especially significant games). Further, 
to enjoy something with others (or even: to enjoy something more when the experience is shared with 
others) does not mean that what one enjoys is others. My principal contention, again, is simply that 
society’s acceptance of sport fandom betrays an implicit endorsement of the pursuit of personal 
gratification as an end in itself. Thanks to Emrys Westacott for prodding me to address this social 
dimension of the value of sport, for many people.
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So, then, what are we cheering?
Many things. While my focus in this paper has been on only certain values, sport 
undoubtedly  offers  several  types  of  rewards.  At  one  level,  it  offers  those  personal 
qualities frequently cited: perseverance, strategic acuity, poise under pressure, and so 
on.  It  offers  excellence:  the  exemplary  display  of  talents,  skills,  and  execution  of 
intention. It offers efficacy and success: winners, who best the other contestants. Sport 
offers heroes who deliver in the clutch or who, over seasons, are consistently the finest 
performers in their roles – some, who raise the level of their sport. It is an arena for 
admiration.47
And at a more telling level,  I  believe, we are cheering purposeful effort – the 
simple phenomenon of human beings wanting things and striving to get them. Quitters 
are booed. The insulation of sport and the artificial nature of its game’s goals – the fact 
that its ends are of no external, practical consequence – suggest that part of what the fan 
cheers is the display of deliberate, thoughtful, goal-directed action – value-pursuit as 
such.  48
 Barnes discusses the allure of greatness quite powerfully on pp. 32 ff, 129 ff, 181 ff.47
 This is broadly similar to Bernard Suits’ contention that because, in games, the goal is without value 48
(apart from its being the goal of that specific game, that is), the value of the enterprise lies in the process 
of value-pursuit and in the achievement of challenging ends. See Suits, pp. 82-83 and Thomas Hurka, 
“Introduction,” Grasshopper, p. 17. I do not subscribe to Suits’ further thesis, however, that in man’s ideal 
condition of utopia, instrumental activity would be obsolete and people’s primary activity would be 
game-playing. (Suits, pp. 150-160, and Hurka, p. 15) For such a scenario eliminates the very conditions 
that make value-pursuit possible and that make it objectively valuable and, thereby, that render it capable 
of providing enjoyment to either agent or observer. Without purpose – more fundamentally, without the 
needs that mandate man’s pursuit of purpose – the very concept of “value” (and correlatively, that which 
is “harmful” or “threatening”) would be incoherent. (For explanation of this, see my Viable Values, pp. 
83-123.) It is precisely because human beings do have “worlds to conquer,” in other words (to use one of 
Suits’ terms, p. 155), that we can enjoy the quest that is highlighted in sports. This fact is not a sufficient 
explanation of some people’s enjoyment of sport, either as player or as serious fan, but it is a necessary 
condition. 
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 “The most exciting thing in life is winning,” it has been said. “And the second 
most exciting thing is losing.”  Being in it can be a thrill.49 50
Sport  showcases  the  human will  in  action,  physicalized and perceptible.  The 
clarity  of  a  game’s  mission,  the  great  significance  with  which  this  end  is  imbued, 
alongside the absence of wider life-affecting impact all suggest that it is the process of 
seeking goals that fans enjoy.  The high failure rate in sport also supports this: the best 51
baseball  batters  make outs  more  often  than they reach base;  “successful”  teams (in 
many sports) typically lose a lot of games, over a season; each contest leaves as much 
frustration, on one side, as satisfaction, on the other. (A rising Crimson Tide sinks a lot 
of other boats.) Fans enjoy not only ultimate success, but the quest.  And much of what 52
fans enjoy about the quest  is  what it  feels  like.  We are not agents in the pursuit  of 
victory,  after  all,  but  onlookers.  We throw ourselves  into  the  caring  and reap deep 
 Barnes attributes this line to “an American gambler,” p. 172. Also see his discussion on pp. 174-175.49
 Consider the thudding falloff in interest when one’s team has been eliminated from postseason 50
contention – or the gleeful surge that greets news that you haven't been eliminated, after all. In a related 
vein, both Almond and Joe Posnanski suggest that fans are cheering on our own lives. See Almond, p. 57, 
and Joe Posnanski, “3000 Reasons to Party,” Sports Illustrated, July 18, 2011, p. 47.
 In a similar vein, see Suits, pp. 156-160. One wonders whether the aesthetic allure of the image of a 51
tiger flying through its paces in chase may be a reflection of this: Living organisms gotta go for the goods 
that sustain them.
 A related phenomenon is what psychologists refer to as “hard fun,” the satisfaction afforded by 52
“overcoming obstacles in pursuit of a goal.” Nicole Lazzaro, quoted in John Tierney, “On a Hunt for What 
Makes Gamers Keep Gaming,” New York Times, Science section, December 7, 2010. Many people enjoy 
games that require difficult problem-solving, such as challenging crossword puzzles, for that very 
difficulty. Kretchmar discusses closely related thoughts in “Normative Heights,” pp. 3, 9.
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satisfaction from feeling all the ups and downs of our goal’s course. This investment is 
an affirmation of trying – value-pursuing action.  53
6. Conclusion 
In winding down these reflections, I should underscore that a reader need not 
subscribe  to  egoism  or  Rand’s  theory  of  value  for  this  proposal  to  be  worth 
contemplating. Sport’s fan base consists of people of widely divergent philosophical 
persuasions; their political, moral, and metaphysical beliefs occupy every corner of the 
intellectual and spiritual landscape. A bond uniting these people’s enthusiasm for sport, 
I think, is the enjoyment of witnessing purposeful effort. The reason that people enjoy 
this  is  that  we  all  engage  in  this  type  of  activity  every  day  (however  modest  or 
momentous  the  various  ends  that  we  pursue)  and  more,  that  we  must  engage  in 
successful  value-pursuit;  we  must  be  efficacious  in  advancing  our  goals. 
Correspondingly, human beings need to regard purposeful effort in a positive light and 
to believe that it is a viable path to achieving our values. Following sport can, at least on 
a  subconscious  level,  help  to  satisfy  these  needs  and reinvigorate  fans’  own value-
pursuits.
The  fan’s  experience,  by  shedding  light  on  how  to  value  (unreservedly;  in 
thought and action and viscera), on the propriety of valuing (for its service to one’s 
personal happiness), and on the point of valuing (joy in living), helps us to appreciate 
 In a related vein, people frequently remark upon the hopefulness inherent in sport. Its ethos is 53
emphatically: Dreams can be realized; effort pays off. Wait till next year. We allow ourselves to be teased 
and hurt, yet invest afresh with each face-off and “batter up.” Failure is treated not as a permanent fate so 
much as a sign that we haven't succeeded yet. The subtext? But we will. Or at least: We can. Which is why 
we try. Hope is implicit in trying to do something. The premise of such effort: “This might do the trick, 
this could help to bring about my end.” 
Separately: my emphasis on the activity of valuing as a value is not meant to aggrandize pursuit 
over achievement, nor to attribute equal value to the two. Certainly, for many or most values, 
achievement is more valuable than the process undertaken to achieve the relevant end. Nonetheless, my 
point is that valuing as such – desiring and trying to get – is valuable. It is an important constituent of a 
fulfilling, flourishing life rather than merely an instrument. Life is in the living. 
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that valuing is a value. It is so, fundamentally, because it is life-advancing. Valuing is 
necessary as motivation to do the things that life requires. It is necessary as means, insofar 
as valuing requires actions aimed to achieve sought ends. And: it’s fun. If one wants to 
live, enjoy it – enjoy the living – which consists of: ongoing valuing. 
Sport for the serious fan is simply fun. Subject to the usual conditions imposed 
by the standard of value, that is all the warrant it needs. This is what the fan at some 
level knows. He reminds us that living – pursuing, the joy of the quest – is the point.     54
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